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Corporate Officer Liability as an
"Operator" Under CERCLA: The
Kelley v. Tiscornia Analysis
CLAY M. STEVENS*
In 1979, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
(MDNR) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sent
notice to Auto Specialties Manufacturing Company (AUSCO)
that landfills located on two company-owned sites were not in
compliance with state regulations.' A leachate test performed in
1981 showed that levels of cadmium and lead exceeded local
drinking water standards.'
In Kelley v. Tiscornia, the MDNR sought cleanup costs for
the two sites from the corporate officers of AUSCO, Lester,
James, and Edward Tiscornia, 3 under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA).4 The United States District Court for the Western District
of Michigan denied motions for summary judgment by both plain-
tiffs and defendants.' The court considered the question of
whether individual corporate officers may be held liable for their
actions as "operators" under CERCLA. Furthermore, if held lia-
ble, what standard is proper to determine whether liability at-
taches to the Tiscornias in this case.'
The Tiscornia court concluded that individual corporate of-
ficers could be potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under CER-
CLA, even though corporate officers are not listed under the stat-
utory definition of "persons" to which the Act applies." The court
* Staff Member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW; J.D.,
Class of 1995, University of Kentucky; B.S., 1986, University of Kentucky.
Kelley v. Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. 1315 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
Id. at 1319.
Id. at 1318.
CERCLA §§101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp at 1325.
'Id.
Id. at 1322. Under CERCLA, an owner or operator refers to "any person," and
"person" is defined as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consor-
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examined four tests for determining whether liability attaches to
corporate individuals as "operators" in connection with CERCLA
violations committed by the corporation.8 The "direct participa-
tion" test was found to be most appropriate because "[t]his stan-
dard recognizes that the statute includes as responsible parties
those that may be found liable under traditional corporate law
principles." 9 This test attaches liability to corporate individuals
who directly participate in the decision making regarding hazard-
ous waste disposal.' ° Since the application of this test involves a
fact question, the court reasoned that summary judgment for ei-
ther party was inappropriate."
This comment will address the issue presented by the Tiscor-
nia case: What are the appropriate methods of determining an in-
dividual corporate officer's potential liability as an "operator" for
the polluting acts of his corporation under CERCLA. Courts ad-
dressing this question have found liability using methods ranging
from the traditional corporate law notions1" to standards based on
tium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." CERCLA
§101(20)(A), (21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A), (21) (1988).
8 Id. at 1323.
9 Id. at 1324. "[T]he Court finds that the direct control or participation test, which
holds individuals accountable for their own tortious acts, is the appropriate standard to be
used in assessing operator liability." d.
1O Id. at 1324-25.
" Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. at 1325. "Because the evidence as now presented is subject
to conflicting interpretations and credibility determinations must be made, summary judg-
ment is improper." Id. The Tiscornia defendants had hired specialists to dispose of the
waste properly and claimed to have made only policy decisions concerning hazardous waste
disposal. However, minutes of the Executive Committee meetings showed that environmen-
tal topics were discussed at Ill out of the 435 meetings. The details of these discussions
were not available for the record, id.
" There are two primary methods of bypassing the limited liability protection of the
corporate entity for corporate individuals: piercing the corporate veil and individual tor-
tious act liability. See generally HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAW OF COR-
PORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, chs. 7, 9 (3rd ed. 1983). Piercing the cor-
porate veil refers to the disregard of the corporation's legal status which gives immunity to
corporate officers or entities from liability for wrongful corporate activities. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1147 (6th ed. 1990). Several courts have applied only traditional corpo-
rate law to CERCLA actions against corporate individuals. See Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James
& Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 224 (W.D. La. 1988), affd, 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1108 (1991). The court rejected, in dicta, any finding of corporate officer
liability for environmental cleanup costs without first piercing the corporate veil because
there is no express Congressional directive in CERCLA to bypass traditional business law
doctrine. Joslyn, 696 F. Supp. at 224-25.
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an individual's control" or direct participation 4 in hazardous
waste disposal and that individual's ability to prevent 5 a hazard-
ous release. In some cases, the standard may have reached the
level of strict liability.'"
Part II of this comment gives a general overview of CER-
CLA. Part III discusses the facts and findings of the Kelley v.
Tiscornia case as a way of interpreting the status of federal law
concerning corporate officer liability as a CERCLA "operator."
Part IV presents an analysis of the Tiscornia court's rationale,
some opinions of commentators, and observations and recommen-
dations for Congress' reauthorization of CERCLA in 1994.
I. CERCLA OVERVIEW
In 1980, Congress hastily enacted CERCLA to facilitate the
cleaning up of existing toxic waste sites through adequate funding
and enforcement authority.' Congress designed CERCLA to ad-
dress the uncontrolled growth of waste sites and to remedy envi-
ronmental problems that have occurred as a result of negligent
waste disposal practices."8 The primary goals of CERCLA were to
provide a system to accelerate the cleanup of hazardous waste
sites and to force those responsible to bear the costs of that
cleanup. 9 CERCLA liability applies to sites where there has been
a release of a hazardous substance or pollutant."0 The government
1" See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F2d 726,
744 (8th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter NEPACCO 11]. In NEPACCO I1, the vice-president,
manufacturing supervisor and main shareholder were found liable as "arrangers" of haz-
ardous substances under § 107(a)(3) because of their ability to exert individual control
over the hazardous waste disposal practices, id.
'4 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Corp., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1543 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
16 See Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under
CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65 (1992): Carolyn
Rashby, United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.: Lender Liability Under CERCLA,
14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569 (1987).
" Cindy A. Wolfer, Piercing The Corporate Veil Under CERCLA: To Control or Not
to Control-Which Is the Answer?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 975, 976 (1991)
8 United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983).
" See Richard G. Stoll, Comprehensive Envir,.n:.iental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 101 (9th ed.
1987); Wolfer, supra note 17.
0 CERCLA defines "release" to be "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emit-
ting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment ...." CERCLA §101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988).
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can draw from two sources to pay for the hazardous waste
cleanup: the Superfund2" and PRPs through private action suits.
2 12
The CERCLA statutory language is broadly phrased to in-
clude PRPs who may be liable for cleanup costs incurred. 3 The
Act specifically provides that "any person who at the time of dis-
posal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility
at which such hazardous substances were disposed of" will be lia-
ble for any and all cleanup costs. 4
The courts have had to struggle to reconcile this language
with traditional corporate law principles based on the theory of
limited liability. 5 CERCLA's legislative history has not aided in
interpreting Congressional intent as to whether traditional corpo-
rate law is to be followed or abandoned in CERCLA's enforce-
ment.26 This basic problem has led to varying methods of attach-
A substance is hazardous if it is already regulated by other environmental statutes
such as the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Toxic Substances Control Act or the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
A "pollutant or contaminant" is to "include ... any element ...which ...upon
exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or assimilation into any organism, . . . will or may reasona-
bly be anticipated to cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic muta-
tion, physiological malfunctions .. .or physical deformations, in such organisms or their
offspring ...." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(33).
" Funds for cleanup costs are raised by a special tax which Congress established for
CERCLA and which originally raised $1.6 billion in 1980. Stoll, supra note 19, at 104.
The special tax enacted by Congress in 1980 for CERCLA was levied mostly against pol-
luting-type industries, id. at 152. The 1986 amendments to CERCLA added $9 billion to
the fund, raised over 5 years, id.
12 Id. at 113. Costs recoverable from PRPs include the government's own investigation
costs, cleanup planning and design costs, as well as the actual cleanup costs, id.
23 Id. Section 9607(a) of CERCLA imposes strict liability on four classes of parties:
(1)The owners and operators of facilities at which there is a release or
threatened release of hazardous substances;
(2)Any person who owned or operated such a facility at any time in the past
when hazardous substances were disposed of;
(3)Any person who "arranged for" the treatment or disposal of hazardous
substance at the facility; and
(4)Any person who transported hazardous substances to the facility.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
24 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (emphasis added).
25 See generally Lauri A. Newton, The Prevention Test: Promoting High-Level Man-
agement, Shareholder, and Lender Participation in Environmental Decision Making
Under CERCLA, 20 EcOLOGY L.Q 313 (1993)
" See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984). "CERCLA is ... a hastily drawn piece of compromise legisla-
tion, marred by vague terminology and deleted provisions .... The courts are once again




ing "owner or operator" liability not only in cases of corporate
officer liability, but also with shareholder liability,2 successor cor-
poration liability,28  lender liability,29  and parent-subsidiary
liability."
The question of how to reconcile CERCLA with traditional
corporate law concerning the liability of corporate officers is espe-
cially important in light of CERCLA's potential reauthorization
and amendment in 1994. The impact is substantial because imple-
mentation of a liability standard against an individual corporate
officer may cause financial ruin while use of another standard can
absolve the individual of all liability. Furthermore, any standard
of conduct required under CERCLA, either in its present form or
with the upcoming changes, must balance the interests involved.
These interests include providing for fairness, remedy, and punish-
ment to promote environmentally-safe conduct and follow the
stare decisis of traditional corporate law.
II. THE KELLEY V. TIsCORNIA APPROACH TO CORPORATE
OFFICER LIABILITY
The decision in Kelley v. Tiscornia reflected a hybrid ap-
proach to CERCLA liability in an unresolved area of environmen-
tal law through corporate and statutory law. In Tiscornia, the dis-
trict court evaluated existing concepts of traditional corporate law,
statutory interpretation, and the "control" and "prevention" stan-
dards which were judicially developed to follow the Congressional
intent in enacting CERCLA.3' The court concluded that liability
should be determined via the "direct participation" test which is
similar to a plain-meaning statutory interpretation of CERCLA. 2
This approach least offends traditional corporate law principles
since it can be likened to a corporate officer tort committed in the
"T Elizabeth A. Glass Geltman, Shareholder Liability for Improper Disposal of Haz-
ardous Waste, 95 Com. L. J. 385, 399 (1990).
18 David C. Clarke, Note, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: A Federal Common
Law Approach, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1300, 1333 (1990).
" Sean P. Madden, Note, Will the CERCLA Be Unbroken? Repairing the Damage
after Fleet Factors, 59 FORDHAM L REV, 135 (1990).
"o Douglas Henderson, Comment, Environmental Law as Corporate Law: Parent-
Subsidiary Liability under CERCLA and the Kayser-Roth Aftermath. 7 J. MIN. L. &
POL'Y 293. 294 (1992).
Kelley v. Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. 1315, 1323 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
I Id. at 1324-25.
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officer's individual capacity.3 3 However, the "direct participation"
standard requires a fact determination concerning the level of in-
volvement of the corporate officer in the polluting activity. 4 As
such, the court denied summary judgment motions by both parties
and allowed the trial to continue fact finding for this purpose."
A. The Facts
The three defendants, Edward, Lester, and James Tiscornia,
were voting shareholders as well as officers of the Auto Specialties
Manufacturing Company.36 Since 1977, each of the Tiscornias
served as members of the AUSCO Executive Committee, which
was responsible for management and property decisions of the cor-
poration.3 7 The defendants disposed of their waste on two corpora-
tion property sites during the late 1970s and early 1980s.' The
Tiscornias claimed that the Executive Committee merely set pol-
icy in environmental matters and did not manage or participate in
those matters.3 " The Executive Committee ensured that people
were in place to comply with the environmental policy and that
waste disposal was performed by employees hired for that pur-
pose.40 It was undisputed that the Tiscornias each had corporate
officer duties and that "baghouse dust" was disposed in the land-
fills.4' A leachate test performed in 1981 on the sites showed sam-
ples which exceeded drinking water standards for cadmium and
lead .42
The court in Tiscornia found two issues involved in the case:
whether a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance
had occurred and whether the defendants were responsible par-
ties. 43 In responding to the first question, the defendants claimed
that at the time of disposal, baghouse dust was not deemed haz-
ardous under state law." The court responded by pointing out the
3 Id. at 1324.
34 fd.
30 Id. at 1325.
11 Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. at 1318.
31 Id.
s Id. at 1318-19.
39 Id at 1319.
40 Id.






retroactive nature of CERCLA and stated that compliance with
state regulations was not a valid defense.15 Since the only valid
defenses were "acts of God, acts of war [sic], and acts or omis-
sions of third parties,"4 the court held that a hazardous release
had been established. 7
For the Tiscornias to be PRPs under CERCLA section
9607(a)(2),48 the court had to determine whether they were "own-
ers or operators."' 9 Since CERCLA does not specifically address
application of the statute to corporate officers, the Tiscornia court
considered whether the Tiscornias could be held individually liable
and if so, by what standards that liability should attach.5
B. Can Liability Attach to Corporate Officers Even Though
They Are Not Specifically Defined as PRPs Under CERCLA?
The Sixth Circuit had set precedent under general owner or
operator CERCLA liability only in the area of owner liability.51
In so doing, they had applied owner liability only to sole share-
holder corporations as in Donahey v. Bogle.52 Noting this, the Tis-
cornia court determined that since the corporation of the defend-
ant officers had multiple shareholders, the defendant's liability
could only exist under operator status.5 a
The Tiscornia court determined that corporate officers could
be held liable as CERCLA operators even though the statute
omits any specific reference to corporate officers as potentially lia-
41 Id. at 1320-21 (citations omitted).
" Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. at 1320 (quoting J.V. Peters & Co., Inc., v. Administrator,
Envtl. Protection Agency, 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985)).
41 Id. at 1321.
" Under owner or operator liability, those persons potentially liable include "[a]ny
person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of .. " CERCLA § 107(a)(2),
42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(2) (1988).
'" Kelley v. Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
50 Id.
Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1993).
52 Id.
*1 Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. at 1321. The court distinguished Donahey from the Tis-
cornias' situation by concluding that liability was established in Donahey on the owner
status of the defendant as the sole shareholder and director of the corporation, id. The
court stated that the Tiscornias could not fulfill the owner status required by Donahey
unless they were all three merged into one person and the existence of outside shareholders
was ignored. Therefore, the only statutory basis of individual liability would be as opera-
tors. Id.
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ble persons.54 The court reasoned that corporate officers could be
potentially responsible persons just as successor corporations had
been judicially determined PRPs under CERCLA even though
they are omitted from the statutory definition. 5 The rationale was
that CERCLA's definition of "person" was never intended to be
exhaustive.56 In the Tiscornia court's own words:
[T]he Court finds that holding accountable those persons, in-
cluding corporate officers, responsible for creating the harm, is
consistent with both the purpose for which Congress enacted
CERCLA, and cases interpreting CERCLA by the Sixth Cir-
cuit. Corporate officer liability, like corporate successor liability,
is a long-standing and universal doctrine of law which is not to
be ignored.5"
III. STANDARDS BY WHICH CORPORATE OFFICER LIABILITY AS
AN OPERATOR MAY ATTACH UNDER THE TIsCORNIA ANALYSIS
Since CERCLA liability could apply to corporate officers, the
Tiscornia court then turned to determining the appropriate stan-
dard under which that liability would attach.5 8 The court ex-
amined four standards: (1) piercing the corporate veil; (2) direct
control over or participation in wrongful conduct; (3) the preven-
tion test; and (4) the capacity to control test.59
" Id. at 1322.
56 Id.
0' The court compared the Tiscornia facts to the analysis of corporate successor liabil-
ity in Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991), a recent Sixth
Circuit case. Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. at 1322-23. In Anspec, the court reasoned that omis-
sion of successor corporations from the definition of potentially responsible persons was
only a matter of the definition being "textually incomplete." Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1246.
The court reached this conclusion because the legislative intent of Congress in passing
CERCLA was to give the term "corporation" its universally accepted meaning and that
the rules of construction of the United States Code specifically provide that the word "asso-
ciation," when used in reference to a corporation, includes successor corporations. Anspec,
922 F.2d at 1246.
Anspec also stated that policy reasons dictated a finding of successor liability since the
legislative purpose of CERCLA was to provide "the federal government with the tools
immediately necessary for a swift and effective response to hazardous waste sites" and
"that those responsible for disposal of chemical poisons bear the cost and responsibility for
remedying the harmful conditions they created." Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1247.
Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. at 1322-23.




A. Traditional Corporate Law: Piercing the Corporate Veil
The Tiscornia court noted that traditional corporate law al-
lows liability to attach to officers by either piercing of the corpo-
rate veil60 or by the tortious acts of the corporate individual.61
Piercing the corporate veil is the classic means of bypassing the
shield of corporate limited liability. 62 Under this theory, the cor-
porate veil is not pierced unless corporate formalities are substan-
tially ignored, the corporation is grossly undercapitalized, or the
corporate purpose is to evade existing obligations (i.e., fraud).63
However, judicial interpretation of CERCLA has taken an expan-
sive approach to liability, stating that in order to prevent frustrat-
ing the legislative purposes of CERCLA, courts put "no [special]
importance upon the corporate form."64 This implication that
CERCLA and federal common law may disregard traditional cor-
porate principles when imposing CERCLA liability has caused
some debate.65 Some commentators resist this idea vehemently,
6' See HENN & ALEXANDER. supra note 12, at 347. The corporate veil, i.e., limited
liability for corporate individuals, is not pierced unless corporate formalities are ignored,
the corporation is undercapitalized, or some type of fraud is involved, id.
61 See Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of
Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine. 86 Nw. U. L REV. 259 (1992). Tort law holds
individuals liable for torts committed as a result of their personal actions, id. at 270. Al-
though the corporate form provides limited liability to shareholders and officers, it does not
relieve personal liability of an individual simply because he/she is acting within an agent-
principle relationship, id at 271. Therefore, corporate officers can be held liable for their
tortious acts, regardless of whether they acted while within their official capacity, id. This
liability of corporate officers is independent of the corporation's liability and arises as a
result of the officers' personal participation in the tort by way of "affirmative actions of
direction, sanction, or cooperation in the wrongful acts of commission or omission." Id.
0" See generally HENN & ALEXANDER. supra note 12, at ch. 7. The basic tenet of
corporate law is that the corporation is an entity itself and that shareholders and officers of
the corporation have limited liability to the extent of their investment in the corporation,
id. The purpose of limited liability is to encourage capital formation in the free enterprise
system. Limited liability allows investors to take risks which are calculated and which do
not expose their personal assets to pay off debts of the corporation. Wolfer, supra note 17,
at 978 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Cor-
poration, 52 CHI. L. REV. 89, 94 (1985) and Henry Manne, Our Two Corporation Sys-
tems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967)).
" See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 12, at 347.
08 See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 24 (D.R.I. 1989) (citing
United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624 (D.N.H. 1988)); New York v. Shore
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985).
"0 See Smith Land and Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d. 86, 91 (3d
Cir. 1988) (holding that Congress intended federal common law to develop in the CER-
CLA arena); see also Healy, supra note 16, at 109 (stating that corporate law has no
bearing on CERCLA liability and that the only relevant question under the plain statutory
1993-94]
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insisting that it will upset the delicate balance of law and
economics."
Although several cases involving corporate officer liability
under CERCLA have used the piercing the corporate veil the-
ory,6 7 those officers were also owners as defined under CERCLA.
Therefore, as pointed out by the Tiscornia court, the application
of piercing is most likely limited to CERCLA owner status.6 8 At
least one commentator agrees, stating that piercing the corporate
veil is used to access owners, not operators. Hence these tech-
niques do not apply at all to a determination of officer liability. 9
The Tiscornia court further observed that the Fifth Circuit recog-
nized distinct tests for owner as opposed to operator status under
CERCLA.
70
meaning is whether the defendant fits the described category, after which liability is im-
posed or not on that basis).
00 Wolfer, supra note 17, at 999. "If federal courts continue to use normal relation-
ships between a parent and subsidiary to justify the extension of liability under CERCLA,
companies may stop investing in businesses that handle toxic chemicals. Limited liability of
corporate shareholders is a well-entrenched policy in our capitalistic society that should be
left untouched without a clear congressional mandate to do otherwise." Id. at 1000.
67 The Fifth Circuit stated in Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th
Cir. 1990), that "without an express Congressional directive to the contrary, common law
principles of corporate law, such as limited liability, govern our court's analysis." Id. at 83.
The court affirmed the district court below in stating that cleanup costs could not attach to
officers unless piercing the corporate veil had occurred, id.
68 Kelley v. Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (W.D. Mich. 1993); see Oswald &
Schipani, supra note 61.
69 Oswald & Schipani, supra note 61, at 274-75. "The notion of 'piercing' should
simply be expunged from CERCLA analysis of officer liability as an irrelevant theory.
Determination of officer liability under CERCLA should focus instead upon the officer's
direct liability for their personal actions and upon CERCLA's statutory language." Id. at
275.
" The Fifth Circuit standard established in Joslyn required veil piercing for owner
status liability to attach, but used a different standard in Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. Int'l
Bldg. Products, Inc.. 931 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1991). The court specified that operator status
was determined by whether there was direct participation in the improper waste disposal
by the officer, id.
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B. The Direct or Personal Participation Standard
The direct participation test developed by New York v. Shore
Realty Corp.7 and United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chemical Co., Inc. (NEPACCO 11)" held that corporate of-
ficers may be liable for cleanup costs if they are found to have
"personally participated in conduct that violated CERCLA."' a In
Shore Realty, the officer was held to have incurred operator liabil-
ity under CERCLA because he was illegally operating a company
site as a waste storage facility and actively allowed new waste to
be stored at the site.
7'
The Tiscornia court ultimately embraced the direct partici-
pation standard as the appropriate standard for assessing operator
liability of corporate officers.7' The basis for this decision was that
the direct participation test followed traditional corporate law
principles while also best effectuating CERCLA's general statu-
tory preference for strict liability. 76 Specifically, the court stated
that it allowed corporate individuals to be held accountable for
their own tortious acts,7 utilizing the "individual tort" method of
bypassing the limited liability of the corporate entity, mentioned
supra.
" New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). In Shore Realty,
a corporation acquired property where hazardous waste had been illegally stored. The of-
ficer who managed the corporation knew that the illegal storage was continuing and failed
to stop it, id. As a result, he was held liable as an operator because of his "direct participa-
tion" in the harm resulting, id.
"Z United States v, Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F. 2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). The NEPACCO plant manufactured hexa-
chlorophene, a disinfectant, which gave off various hazardous and toxic by-products. Edwin
Michaels, president and shareholder, formed the company and was involved in the con-
struction of the Missouri plant at issue in the case. After a year of operation, Michaels
returned to his permanent home in Connecticut and left John Lee, the vice-president and
shareholder, to run the company. Lee contracted with an employee to dispose of the dioxin
waste by way of depositing it in a trench located on James Denney's farm. The trial court
found Lee was liable for cleanup costs due to his direct participation in the hazardous
release and his capacity to control hazardous substances at the plant, id. at 732. On appeal,
the court affirmed only on the direct participation standard, id. at 749.
73 Id. at 744.
, Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1052.
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1. Legal Basis of the Direct Participation Standard
There is significant disagreement concerning whether the di-
rect participation standard truly reflects corporate individual tort
liability. Some commentators agree wholeheartedly with the Tis-
cornia analysis that the standard exemplifies traditional corporate
law, 8 while others believe the direct participation test is an ex-
pansion of liability for corporate officers which is without founda-
tion.7 9 This perceived expansion is often justified by references to
CERCLA's primary goal of ensuring that those benefiting from
improper waste disposal pay to clean up the resulting hazardous
waste problems.8"
Commentator Michael P. Healy, taking a purely statutory
approach, skips the entire question of whether the direct participa-
tion test is grounded in traditional corporate law, reasoning that
CERCLA provides a wholly sufficient foundation for imposing lia-
bility without the need to consider CERCLA's effect on tradi-
tional corporate doctrine. 8 He concludes that the direct participa-
tion test is not a fault-based standard but a strict liability
71 Oswald & Schipani, supra note 61, at 275. It is commonly accepted that traditional
corporate law doctrine allows officers to be individually liable for direct tortious acts while
acting for the corporation without requiring a piercing of the corporate veil, id.
In cases determining officer liability by the personal participation test, regardless of
whether the courts claim to be using traditional corporate law principles of attaching indi-
vidual liability to officers for their tortious actions or whether the courts claim to be di-
rectly applying the statutory language of CERCLA,
[tihe common thread running throughout these cases is the application, if not
the articulation, of the traditional rule that "[a] corporate officer may be
held liable if he personally participates in the wrongful, injury-producing
act." In every instance, the officers were held liable because of their direct
participation in the environmental violation just as they would have been
held liable had they directly participated in any other tort. One should not be
led astray by the courts' concomitant discussions of the language of CER-
CLA; these cases involve nothing more than the application of traditional
corporate law principles.
Id. at 282.
" John J. Little, Towards Respect for Corporate Separateness in Defining the Reach
of CERCLA Liability, 44 Sw. L.J. 1499, 1514, 1516 (1991). "Such an expansion is unsup-
ported by the language of CERCLA, its scant legislative history and traditional notions of
statutory interpretation." Id. at 1516. Little further states that "nothing in the statute or
its legislative history suggests that Congress intended to subvert or substantially alter well-
settled common law principles of corporation law ... ." Id. at 1514.
80 CERCLA GOALS ARE REMEDIAL: To CLEAN UP HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES AT
THE COST OF THOSE WHO BENEFITED FROM THE POLLUTING ACTIONS. S. REP. NO. 848,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-15, 31-34 (1980); see also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985).
*' Healy, supra note 16, at 146.
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standard in which an individual and a corporation stand side by
side.8" Attachment of liability is, thus, determined by whether the
individual's personal actions violated CERCLA's plain statutory
language in exactly the same way that a corporation's collective
actions are examined to determine a violation of the Act.8 s Healy
surmises that this is what was intended by the plain meaning of
the statute, and CERCLA is a heightened standard of liability to
which all other tests and factors do not apply.84
Another commentator, Linda J. Oswald, finds flaws in the
abandonment of corporate law doctrine in the CERCLA con-
text.85 Oswald states that this statutory basis is problematic be-
cause it sets up a two-tiered test not envisioned by CERCLA: (1)
applying a fault based analysis to whether an individual "person-
85 Id. at 72, 109.
I3 d. at 109.
', Id. at 108. In addressing the several courts' applications of the differing standards
of the prevention test, the capacity to control test, piercing of the corporate veil test and
direct participation test, Healy states that none of the factors in these tests provide a mate-
rial or proper basis for individual liability under CERCLA. Id. This inadequacy results in
"confounding the future imposition of individual liability under section [96]07." Id. Healy
attempts to clear up the confusion by advocating a plain reading of the Act, implying that
individual corporate officers are included within the definition of a CERCLA operator as a
matter of law, just as the attorneys for MDNR (the state agency plaintiffs seeking recoup
of cleanup costs) claimed in Tiscornia:
A possible explanation of courts' failure to present fully coherent rationales
for individual liability lies in the courts' failure to rely on the heightened
standard of care for waste disposal activities intended by Congress. If there
had been proper recognition of this central purpose of CERCLA, the courts
and the parties would have focused more intently on the actual activities of
the individuals alleged to be liable for response costs, and they would have
distinguished more carefully between managing a facility through involve-
ment.in broad financial decision making and operating a facility through in-
volvement in disposal activities.
Notwithstanding the limitations of the analysis in these decisions, the
result in each case may be reconciled with the CERCLA liability scheme. As
long as these cases arc understood to assign direct liability for CERCLA
response costs to an individual or corporation based on the "person['s]" di-
rect participation in the hazardous substance disposal activities identified in
the statute, the decisions are fully consistent with the statutory language and
intent.
Id. at 109 (footnote omitted); see Riverside Market Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg.
Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1991). The court, embraced the approach above
by holding that to determine an individual's liability for CERCLA response costs, they
must look at "the extent of the defendant's personal participation in the alleged wrongful
conduct." Riverside Market Dev., 931 F.2d at 330.
86 See generally Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A
Normative Analysis. 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 579 (1993): Oswald & Schipani. supra
note 61.
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ally participated" in the negligent activity and is therefore, a
PRP; and (2) if found to be a PRP, holding him or her strictly
liable for cleanup costs under the CERCLA scheme. 6 Given this
divergence from the statutory scheme, Oswald suggests that the
most consistent method of attaching liability would be to simply
rely on the theory of traditional tort and agency law doctrine di-
rectly, "without attempting to frame it in CERCLA's statutory
language."
87
2. The Effect of Direct Participation as a Strict Liability
Standard
Regardless of the basis for the direct participation test, there
is much speculation on its impact. Since the test does not consider
fault as a balancing factor, many commentators consider its net
effect to be an imposition of strict liability on corporate officers for
the environmental actions of the corporation.88
Commentators have opined that using this quasi-strict liabil-
ity standard encourages corporate entities to take a "hands-off ap-
proach to operations connected to hazardous sites in order to dis-
tance themselves from potentially catastrophic liability under the
Act."89 Strict statutory liability under CERCLA works well with
corporations that can spread the costs of paying for the hazardous
releases among its customers and that are able to pay for these
costs with profits which were gained as a result of the polluting
activitiesY0 But for individuals who cannot spread risks and costs,
fairness becomes a major concern, and a standard of liability
based on fault is necessary. 9' Further, corporations benefit from
their polluting actions, but officers receive only salaries which do
not necessarily mirror an increase in corporate profits. 2 In this
88 Oswald, supra note 85, at 615-16.
87 Id. at 616. "There is nothing fundamentally inconsistent with holding the corpora-
tion strictly liable under CERCLA and simultaneously holding the officer liable under a
common law fault-based standard where the facts support such individual liability, nor can
such a result be said to be inconsistent with the goals and objectives of CERCLA." Id.
(footnote omitted.)
88 See generally Newton, supra note 25.
89 Id. at 338.
90 Id.
9' Oswald, supra note 85, at 584. "Essentially applying the strict liability standard to
an officer simply sticks some other hapless individual, as opposed to the victim, with the





sense, strict liability may be too harsh, providing negative incen-
tive for environmentally-safe conduct by officers."3 In sum, the di-
rect participation test probably best embodies the statutory lan-
guage of CERCLA, although efforts to base it in corporate law by
the Tiscornia court and others are probably wishful thinking.
C. The Prevention Test
The prevention test, pioneered by Kelley v. ARCO Industries
Corp.' and Kelley v. Thomas Solvent,'5 determines whether lia-
bility attaches based on the officer's ability to prevent the environ-
mental harm from occurring.96 It focuses on two factors: (1) the
individual's position and degree of authority within the company
and with respect to health and safety factors; and (2) positive and
negative actions concerning hazardous waste disposal.' 7 The in-
quiry is whether the individual "could have prevented or signifi-
cantly abated the hazardous waste discharge that is the basis of
the claim."' 8 It takes into account genuine efforts to prevent haz-
ardous substance release as an affirmative defense to attachment
of CERCLA liability to individual corporate officers. 99
It is important to note that the Tiscornia court, under Judge
McKeague, dismissed consideration of the prevention test with
less than adequate explanation.100 Yet this is the same court, the
Id.
723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
95 727 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
" Kelley v. ARCO Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
97 Id.
This Court will look to evidence of an individual's authority to control,
among other things, waste handling practices-evidence such as whether the
individual holds the position of officer or director, especially where there is a
co-existing management position; distribution of power within the corpora-
tion, including position in the corporate hierarchy and percentage of shares
owned. Weighed along with the power factor will be evidence of responsibil-
ity undertaken for waste disposal practices, including evidence of responsibil-
ity undertaken and neglected, as well as affirmative attempts to prevent un-
lawful hazardous waste disposal. Besides responsibility neglected, it is
important to look at the positive efforts of one who took clear measures to
avoid or abate the hazardous waste damage.
Kelley v. Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1543-44 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
" Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. at 1543.
I d. at 1544.
100 Kelley v. Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. 1315, 1323 (W.D. Mich. 1993). In stressing
corporate law and ignoring strong persuasive-value case law from the Sixth Circuit in
Donahey and the Western District of Michigan in Thomas Solvent, Judge McKeague gave
his succinct rationale for quickly dismissing the prevention test:
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Western District of Michigan, which first developed the preven-
tion test in Thomas Solvent in 1989 under Judge Enslen. °t' The
court's speedy refusal to consider the prevention test stemmed
from the court's belief that the test had no basis in corporate law
doctrine." 2 Another criticism not mentioned by the Tiscornia
In the opinion of this Court, this test results in expanded liability based on a
corporate officer's position, a formulation which ignores basic principles of
corporate law. Power or authority is not a relevant factor in determining lia-
bility of a corporate officer for tortious conduct. For this reason the Court
declines to adopt this test.
Id. at 1324.
101 See Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. 1532.
101 Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. at 1324. Judge McKeagut had three major obstacles in
his path in ruling out the prevention test in Tiscornia and favoring corporate law princi-
ples. First, the Western District of Michigan, under Judge Enslen, had originally developed
and adopted the prevention test in several cases. See Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. at
1532; Kelly v. Arco Industries Corp., 723 F. Supp. 214 (W.D. Mich. 1989). Although this
was not controlling precedent for Judge McKeague, it must have held some persuasive
value.
Second, the Sixth Circuit had just set binding precedent for the prevention test under
the "owner" half of the "owner or operator" prong of CERCLA liability in Donahey v.
Bogle. Similarly, since Donahey did not directly address "operator" liability, Judge Me-
Keague was not bound by precedent to use the prevention test if this case was character-
ized as concerning only operators.
However, he most certainly would have been bound by Donahey to use the prevention
test had the Tiscornia court considered this case a question of owner liability under CER-
CLA. Owner liability was McKeague's most severe obstacle and appropriately, he gave his
most illogical rationale. McKeague stated in Tiscornia that since there had been only one
Sixth Circuit case which had addressed owner and operator liability under CERCLA and
that it had only directly addressed a sole proprietorship under CERCLA owner status, the
Tiscornia court was forced to conclude that owner status only applied to sole proprietor-
ships under CERCLA. Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. at 1321. "To find Donahey controlling in
this case, the Court would have to merge the three Tiscornia defendants into a single per-
son and ignore the existence of other shareholders." Id., 827 F. Supp. at 321. If the Tiscor-
nia court can infer that corporate officers were meant to be included in the definition of
liable persons under CERCLA because general definitions of "corporations" usually in-
clude corporate officers, then they can much more easily infer that when the Donahey court
classifies a sole proprietorship as an owner under CERCLA, it would include corporations,
partnerships and individuals as well.
In sum, McKeague ignored persuasive on-point case law from his own federal district
court, ignored a persuasive associated-point case from the Sixth Circuit in Donahey, and
wrongly characterized the facts of the case to involve only officer liability instead of prop-
erly examining liability under both officer and owner status. All of this side-stepping was
necessary to dismiss consideration of the prevention test in Tiscornia.
In a case subsequent to Tiscornia involving CERCLA officer status liability, Judge
Enslen criticized the Tiscornia holding and Judge McKeague, specifically, for his use of
the direct participation test instead of the prevention test. See United States v. Taylor, No.
90-CV851, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19082, at *19-23 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 1993). Judge
Enslen, addressing the incongruity of McKeague's rulings with his own on this subject,
stated:
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Court was that the test fails to implement the general strict liabil-
ity standard of CERCLA due to the availability of the affirmative
defense that the officer made efforts to avoid or abate the harm.
1 0
3
These criticisms were recognized by the Thomas Solvent
court, but that court found the test justified due to the "harsh and
broad-sweeping" liability under a strict liability scheme. 0 4 The
prevention test was designed as a compromise or middle-ground
position between the strict liability present in a plain reading of
CERCLA and the often too-protective traditional corporate lim-
ited liability."0 Rather than attempting to ground the test in
CERCLA's statutory language, these cases have unabashedly con-
structed a progressive test based on fairness principles, economics,
and the goals of CERCLA in promoting prevention and remedy-
ing existing releases. 10 6 This middle-ground position encourages
corporate officers to accept responsibility in the environmental
management process.
1. Prevention Versus Direct Participation
The benefits of the prevention test become clear when com-
pared with other tests, specifically the direct participation test.
With strict statutory liability under the direct participation test, a
corporate official involved in waste disposal decision making may
do everything possible to dispose of hazardous waste in an envi-
ronmentally-safe manner. However, after contracting for the re-
moval of the substance, the transporter may accidentally spill
while loading a truck. Under the direct participation test, the of-
ficer would be personally liable because of his direct participation
in the disposal.108 Thus, the direct participation test does not take
into account any positive efforts made by that officer in the dispo-
The Court recognizes that, as with a split in the circuits, a split in this dis-
trict causes unfortunate confusion and ambiguity in the law. The Court
welcomes the day when the Sixth Circuit may render a decision that settles
the matter not only for sole shareholders of corporations as in Donahey, but
also for officers and employees who may also be individually liable as
operators.
Taylor, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19082, at *23.
103 See Newton, supra note 25, at 334.
104 Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1543 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
.01 Id. at 1543-44; see also Newton, supra note 25, at 334.
See Newton, supra note 25, at 334.
107 Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. at 1544.
108 See Oswald, supra note 85, at 590.
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sal of the waste, while the prevention test would allow this to be
an affirmative defense to the attachment of liability.
Further, aside from a lack of fairness in the direct participa-
tion test, a statutory strict liability standard may also frustrate
one long-term goal of creating incentives for safe behavior by
those in the best position to control such disposal methods."0 '
Those who are potentially encouraged to help in improving dispo-
sal techniques might simply avoid becoming involved at all, fear-
ing attachment of the full joint and several weight of the corpora-
tion's liability without regard to individual fault.11
2. Commentary on the Prevention Test
One criticism of the prevention test is that it has no strong
foundation in case law or statutory law upon which to stand."' As
such, it appears to be a form of judicial legislation. However,
CERCLA's legislative history indicates that federal common law
may be developed by courts to fill any gaps."' The prevention
test, therefore, becomes more justified under CERCLA with every
new case opinion that adopts it.
Another criticism focuses on the fact that since the preven-
tion test allows a PRP to provide an affirmative defense to liabil-
ity, it does not follow the general policy of CERCLA in imposing
strict liability and, as such, is an inappropriate method of deter-
mining whether CERCLA liability attaches." 3 However, the pre-
vention test can be viewed as determining only which parties are
responsible parties, after which the strict liability of CERCLA
settles on their shoulders." 4
The prevention test is not a bright-line test and requires a
fact determination considering the totality of the circumstances
involved.1"0 Strict liability is more predictable, easier to imple-
ment and saves judicial resources. However, courts that decline to
'" Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. at 1544-45.
110 Id.
See Kelley v. Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. 1315 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
222 The House sponsor of CERCLA, Congressmen Florio, stated: "To insure the de-
velopment of a uniform rule of law, and to discourage business[es] dealing in hazardous
substances from locating primarily in states with more lenient laws, the bill will encourage
the further development of a Federal common law in [this] area and law." 126 CoNG. REC.
31,965 (1980).
1' Newton, supra at note 25, at 335-36.
I ld.
, Kelley v. Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1544 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
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use the prevention test on this basis alone ignore the fact that it
may provide the most equitable standard for attachment of CER-
CLA liability to corporate officers. Moreover, the prevention test
could foster progressive environmental policies and practices by
corporate individuals and could create incentives for safe behav-
ior.116 The prevention test would not allow corporate individuals to
avoid liability by divorcing themselves from waste disposal prac-
tices in a "see no evil, hear no evil" mentality,1 ' whereas the di-
rect participation test would allow just this situation, thus promot-
ing irresponsibility and frozen indecision in corporate waste
disposal. Finally, the prevention test provides an economic benefit.
Since all such CERCLA cleanup costs are distributed among tax-
payers and consumers, economic savings would be realized since
prevention is cheaper than cleaning up a site. Although the Tis-
cornia court dismissed the prevention test because it was viewed
as a judicially-created solution, it remains a viable and equitable
option for Congress in considering amendments for CERCLA's
potential reauthorization.
D. The Capacity to Control Test
In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemi-
cal Co. (NEPACCO I),"" the court stated that direct participa-
tion might not be necessary. A "capacity to control" hazardous
waste activities was enough to impose CERCLA liability on of-
ficers, even if the capacity was not utilized."" This standard is
similar to the direct participation test. However, the focus of the
control test is on the degree or type of control the corporate officer
exercises over the activities leading to the CERCLA violation.
1 20
"l See generally Newton, supra note 25.
Thomas Solvent, 727 F. Supp. at 1544-45.
"' 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), afd in part, rev'd in part, NEPACCO II,
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). In NEPACCO 1, the
court applied a personal participation test in holding Lee and Michaels individually liable.
Part of the court's analysis indicated more of a control test. NEPACCO 1, 579 F. Supp. at
823. The control part of this standard was ignored when NEPACCO II overruled the lower
court on the finding of operator liability under § 9607(a)(2) and instead imposed trans-
porter liability under § 9607(a)(3) using only the personal participation portion of the
standard applied in NEPACCO I. NEPACCO 11 810 F.2d at 726.
" NEPACCO 11, 810 F.2d at 726. Although NEPACCO H reversed the finding of
NEPACCO I for liability as an "operator," this reversal was due to a finding that
NEPACCO was not a "facility" under § 9607(a)(2), id.
"I0 See, e.g., United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 ENVrL. L. REP. 20,699, 20,700
(D.S.C. 1984) (stating that "to the extent that an individual has control or authority over
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This approach has only been adopted by a few courts in assessing
corporate officer liability.'
12
The Tiscornia Court ruled out the control test for considera-
tion because the available jurisdictional case law had not applied
it to owner or operator actions,1 22 but only to cases involving ar-
ranger liability. 123 In summarily declining both the prevention and
control tests, the court evidenced its disdain for either progressive
approach to the policy problems involved in following either the
statutory or a true corporate individual tort test.
1. Commentary on the Control Test
Commentators state that the capacity to control and preven-
tion tests are two attempts to create new standards for determin-
ing liability under CERCLA by expanding officer liability beyond
traditional corporate law notions in order to effectuate the Act's
goals.'" The capacity to control standard has been criticized be-
cause: (1) taken to its logical extreme, every CERCLA violation
could be traced back to an officer whose exercise of or failure to
exercise decision-making control resulted in the hazardous release;
and (2) "responsible" officers would have to be held individually
strictly liable, even if morally and legally blameless.2 '
However, courts that have implemented the control test have
not relied upon mere officer status to impose liability in CERCLA
actions.'26 Supporters of the control test further claim that it does
the activities of a facility from which hazardous substances are released or participates in
the management of such a facility, he may be held liable for response costs incurred at the
facility notwithstanding the corporate character of the business").
1. See, e.g., United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 764 F. Supp. 565, 571 (E.D.
Mo. 1991) (holding the president was individually liable due to his authority to control the
disposal of hazardous waste).
"' CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
", 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
LU Oswald, supra note 85, at 616-17. Oswald states, on the other hand, that the direct
participation test is based in traditional corporate law doctrine, piercing the corporate veil,
id.
12 Id. at 614-15,
,26 Oswald & Schipani, supra note 61.
[Although] the control test may appear to relax traditional liability stan-
dards somewhat by suggesting that something less than actual participation
or involvement in the wrongdoing will impose personal liability on officer,
courts have applied the test in a manner which focuses on operational con-
trol, i.e., control over actual hazardous waste disposal practices, not general
managerial control over the corporation. The control test does not, therefore,
rely upon mere officer status in imposing liability."
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not deviate from traditional corporate liability for direct tortious
injury because specific control over hazardous waste disposal is
required. 12 7 This result is true even though the control test can
impose liability regardless of whether the control was exercised or
not, since just like a tort standard, it covers both malfeasance and
nonfeasance." 8
One of the biggest problems with the control test is that it
further blurs the distinction between the direct participation test
and the prevention test, being similar in some ways to each of
those tests. Control over waste disposal practices may allow a cer-
tain amount of implied fault into the analysis, since failing to ex-
ercise proper control could be construed as fault. 29 In this way,
the control test may be similar to the prevention test. On the other
hand, the ability to control could involve many persons who are
completely removed from the decision-making process, amounting
to attachment of bona fide strict liability. The true persona of the
control test may swing either way, depending on the view of the
court that implements it. It may be this lack of definition that has
caused some courts to shun the control test in favor of the direct
participation and prevention tests. While the control test arguably
is based in corporate law through corporate individual tort, the
direct participation test holds more solid ground.
IV. OBSERVATIONS ON THE 1994 CERCLA REAUTHORIZATION
One of the greatest concerns regarding CERCLA liability as
imposed on corporate individuals is the strict liability standard.
"Imposition of strict liability is guided by a number of policies
and objectives such as the promotion of fairness, economic effi-
ciency, risk-spreading, [internalization costs,] and deterrence." 3 '
Id. at 290-91.
137 Id. (emphasis added).
128 Id.
"Breach of a legal duty, through nonfeasance, as well as misfeasance or mal-
feasance, can give rise to liability under traditional doctrine. Thus, to the
extent that an officer has exercised control over hazardous waste disposal
practices in a wrongful manner, or has failed to exercise authority delegated
to him or her so that a harm results, imposition of liability on that officer is
in keeping with traditional doctrine."
ld.
129 See generally Oswald & Schipani, supra note 61.
180 Oswald, supra note 85, at 592. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d
897 (Cal. 1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
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While these policies are effectively achieved when applied to large
corporations, 131 they fail when applied to individual officers. 132
Courts have recognized this ineffectiveness and have responded
with the several approaches examined in Tiscornia as a way of
adding a layer of culpability or fault, while still fitting into the
statutory rubric of CERCLA strict liability. 33 With this result in
mind, two groups, a fairness faction and a corporate law faction,
have emerged as challengers to the current CERCLA imposition
of strict liability derived from the plain-meaning of the statute.
A. The Fairness Faction
The fairness faction centers their solution on the prevention
test. They have suggested CERCLA must address the inherent
differences between individual and corporate violators of the
Act.' This difference, they argue, is taken into account by the
prevention test, an unabashed judicial reworking of CERCLA's
imposition of liability.
In addressing individuals, CERCLA should shift away from
purely remedial goals and toward promoting incentives for new
ideas and trends in safe disposal.aaa Lauri Newton claims the pre-
vention test best performs that task." 6 The prevention test would
alleviate some of the imbalance of corporate law and economics
Oswald, supra note 85, at 611. The policy objective of fairness, risk-spreading,
economic efficiency and deterrence are achieved when applied to corporations: (1) X corpo-
ration received economic gain from the production activities creating the hazardous wastes,
thus fairness dictates that it pay for the harm created (fairness); (2) X corporation can
raise the price of widgets to cover any additional liability (risk-spreading); (3) increased
liability creates incentives for reducing production of hazardous waste (deterrence); and
(4) strict liability saves costs of litigating (economic efficiency), id.
132 Id. at 612. If a spill occurs and an officer is found liable even though the officer is
not at fault and has made genuine efforts to avoid hazardous releases, it does not fulfill
policy goals to find him or her strictly liable: (1) an individual officer gains no economic
benefit from the hazardous waste production or disposal; (2) an individual cannot spread
risk and internalize costs of cleanup because an individual cannot pass along these costs to
the consumer; (3) although, the risk may create incentive for the officer to take measures
to minimize risk of environmental harm at the facility, the ability to do so will be con-
strained by the officer's position and authority within the corporation; and (4) since there
can be no internalization, there can be no economic efficiency gained, id.
Id.
13 See Newton, supra note 25, at 340-43.
1 Id. at 344.
IN Id.
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caused by fear of the severe consequences of liability attaching to
corporate officers." 7
One commentator, William Biel, feels the prevention test
could be added to current corporate law doctrine." 8 He character-
izes the prevention test as being an "environmental" business
judgment rule."' 9 Just as the business judgment rule allows corpo-
rate officers a shield from liability under certain circumstances, so
would the prevention test. 4" It has been suggested that CER-
CLA's expansion of corporate officer liability has upset the bal-
ance that corporate law achieves between law and economics. " '
Biel states that the prevention rule would work to restore this bal-
l' William S. Biel, Comment, Whistling Past the Waste Site: Directors' and Officers'
Personal Liability for Environmental Decisions and the Role of Liability Insurance Cover-
age, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 241(1991). Although heavily fact-specific, the prevention test [at]
the very least ...
allows corporate D&Os [directors and officers] to prove that the practices
used and individual precautions taken to prevent the release of hazardous
substances meet a threshold standard of care. By meeting such a standard,
individual D&Os would avoid joint and several liability with other PRPs for
accidental releases of hazardous substances. Such a standard reflects the
traditional common law notions underlying the business judgment rule. The
prevention test, therefore, reflects the uncertainty involved in many corporate
decisions that have potential environmental effects and promotes responsible
decision- making.
Id. at 253.
"38 Id. at 252-53.
139 Id. An example of the business judgment rule is when "courts will not hold officers
and directors liable for decisions made if there is no bad faith, negligence, gross abuse of
discretion or self dealing." HEN & ALEXANDER, supra note 12, at 661-63. The business
judgment rule is used in cases involving fiduciary duties where a business decision is in-
volved. Id.
Biel supposes that an "environmental" business judgment rule, probably embodied in
the prevention test, would give officers the same type of protection from attacks of the
government for cleanup costs that the traditional business judgment rule provides from
attacks of the shareholders. Biel, supra note 137, at 253. The basic idea behind both con-
cepts is that businesses cannot function at all if every decision that the officer makes may
be challenged and second-guessed at a cost of full liability for that decision. Biel, supra
note 137, at 247.
Such a rule should not protect D&Os who personally participate in environ-
mental contamination by making reckless or grossly negligent environmental
decisions, but should protect decisions to use the most environmentally safe
means available at the time the decision is made. Such a common law rule,
similar to the business judgment rule, may counteract the legal environment
of increased personal exposure to environmental liability.
Biel, supra note 137, at 247.
..0 Biel, supra note 137, at 253.
141 Id.
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ance, making the market and environment work efficiently. 4"
Without some protection from strict liability, the increase of cor-
porate individual risk may cause managers to fail by acting con-
servatively in an attempt to avoid liability by distancing them-
selves from the disposal or by refusing to take risks.14 " This
reaction may be detrimental to safe environmental practices as
well as affect corporate profitability and success.' 4
B. The Corporate Law Faction
The corporate law faction believes that use of traditional
forms of corporate liability can best prevent upsetting the delicate
balance of corporate law and the marketplace. 4 " Any more ex-
pansion of a model opens the door for courts to allow strict liabil-
ity to attach to corporate officers in a regular fashion, destroying
the basis of corporate law doctrine."' This move away from strict
liability is advocated by way of existing corporate law only, in-
stead of a progressive approach of the prevention test ilk.'
47
Oswald questions the application of CERCLA's strict liabil-
ity standard as applied to corporate officer liability:
It is not at all clear that Congress intended such an expansion in
liability when it enacted CERCLA, nor is it clear that such an
expansion is consistent with the rationale of CERCLA's statu-
14 Id. Biel gives an example of how this environmental business judgment rule would
work:
[Clonsider the normal situation of a director who has made a good faith
environmental decision, such as deciding to use the best available means for
containing and disposing of hazardous wastes. Under the business judgment
rule, the director would expect that if the best available means accord with
industry standards and CERCLA liability results regardless of those best
available means, he will still be protected from shareholder suits.
Id. at 255.
143 Biel, supra note 137, at 257.
144 Id.
Corporate managers must continue to operate their corporations as best as
they can--charged with fiduciary duties toward the shareholders on the one
hand, but vulnerable to individual liability on the other hand. No legal stan-
dard of protection exists for those directors and officers who by act or by
chance find themselves personally associated with a Superfund site. The con-
cept of fiduciary duty of director and officers to shareholders can be broad-
ened to apply to decisions affecting the environment as well.
Id. at 282. (footnotes omitted.)
I" Oswald & Schipani, supra note 61, at 262.
146 Id.
141 Oswald, supra note 85, at 582-85.
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tory goals of cleaning up contaminated sites and ensuring that,
to the extent feasible, those responsible for the contamination
bear the costs of that cleanup. " 8
Oswald maintains that judicially-crafted tests created to rem-
edy the inadequacies of CERCLA's strict liability are not superior
to traditional corporate law tests as applied to corporate
individuals. " 9
C. Coexistence of the Two Factions
Both factions suggest solutions to CERCLA's strict liability
for corporate individuals which have merit. Most commentators
agree that any solution is better than the statutory one of strict
liability.
But the Tiscornia decision best illustrates the problems in-
volved with these competing factions. As mentioned supra, Tiscor-
nia was decided in the Western District of Michigan where the
prevention test was developed and applied by Judge Enslen.
Within this district, Judge Enslen has recently ruled that corpo-
rate officer liability is determined by the prevention test, 50 follow-
ing his prior decisions in Thomas Solvent.'" ' Since Judge Mc-
Keague in Tiscornia ruled that his standard for officer liability
was the direct participation test,'52 the law is left in a state of
1I8 ld. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 253 (Ill), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3038 (noting that Congress' goals in enacting CERCLA were "(1) to
provide for clean-up if a hazardous substance is released into the environment or if such
release is threatened, and (2) to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these clean-
ups"). Oswald goes on to observe:
Imposition of personal liability upon individuals, whether officers or share-
holders, has typically been regarded as the exception, not the norm, in corpo-
rate law. Before the courts abandon well-established legal principles in favor
of a statutory extension of liability, they should be certain that the legislature
intended such an extension; likewise, before the legislature mandates such an
expansion of liability, it should be certain that expanded liability furthers,
rather than hinders, its legislative goals and objectives.
Id. at 583.
"' Id. The time is right to step back and recognize that "the traditional principles of
law already provide adequate mechanisms for holding these parties personally liable in
appropriate circumstances." Id. at 636.
180 United States v. Taylor, No. 90-CV851, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19082, at *23
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 1993). Enslen openly criticized McKeague for his ruling in Tiscornia
and his finding that the prevention test is appropriate for corporate officer liability. Id; see
also supra note 102 (discussing the prevention test).
181 727 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
052 Kelley v. Tiscornia, 827 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
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ambiguity. Certainly a decision of the Sixth Circuit on this issue
would resolve the inconsistency, but the better solution is for Con-
gress to clarify the proper standard under the upcoming
reauthorization. Such a clarification would allow a uniform solu-
tion, saving judicial resources which have been expended in grap-
pling with this issue. The need for such a solution is clearly estab-
lished and illustrated by the subject of this comment, Kelley v.
Tiscornia.
CONCLUSION
The Tiscornia court exemplifies the corporate law faction by
supporting corporate individual liability as operators under CER-
CLA. However, these courts may be too preoccupied with trying
to fit square pegs into round holes. That is, these courts are trying
to reconcile CERCLA liability with traditional corporate law ap-
proaches, while being too unconcerned about the most proper and
equitable solution for CERCLA liability for operators.
In exploring the current range of officer liability standards,
the Tiscornia court correctly rules out piercing the corporate veil
as an applicable standard since it applies mostly to owner liability.
It further identifies the prevention and control tests as judicially-
crafted with no true statutory or common law basis. However, the
court does stretch to reach its conclusion that the direct participa-
tion test is fully within traditional tort law as an implementation
of corporate individual tortious liability.
The biggest flaw with this reasoning is that the direct partici-
pation test lacks a causation element. At best, causation is pre-
sumed because of the corporate individual's involvement with
waste disposal. Since this test is interpreted by many to be
pseudo-strict liability, the test diverges from standard corporate
individual tort. This result effectively places the direct participa-
tion test on the same ground as other judicially-created remedies
under CERCLA as applied to corporate individuals. It has little
direct basis for its existence as well. However, its similarity to
strict liability means that it best follows a statutory interpretation
of CERCLA.
The control test suffers from the biggest flaws found in both
the direct participation standard and the prevention test. It can be
construed to be unlimited liability for officers based on their status
alone, an even higher standard than the near-strict liability stan-
dard of the direct participation test. It can also be viewed as con-
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taining a fault element since a determination of whether the de-
fendant could have controlled toxic waste disposal really amounts
to implied fault in that he had capacity to avoid the harm. This
combination of flaws may have caused most courts to avoid it.
The prevention test, although perhaps the most equitable, is
very progressive and far-reaching. It effectuates both short- and
long-term goals of CERCLA. But, the fact that it is judicially-
crafted tends to prejudice courts against using it. However, this
may not clash with the long-range intent of the statute, since the
legislative history supports the development of federal common
law in this area.
Therefore, the direct participation test and the prevention test
are the most viable alternatives. The direct participation test has
the strongest basis for existence in current law. Healy claims it
follows CERCLA, and the Tiscornia court claimed it embodied
traditional corporate law doctrine. The prevention test recognizes
the dilemma that officer liability represents and presents the most
economic and fair approach. Courts and commentators alike
agree, however, that a strict liability standard is too oppressive to
apply to corporate officers, especially in the absence of specific
Congressional intent.153 The mere existence of these varying tests
reveal the court's recognition of this near consensus and signal the
gradual move away from strict liability for officers under
CERCLA.
. Oswald, supra note 85, at 635-37.
When the benefits are so small, and the risks so great, expansion of liability
should be undertaken cautiously. Traditional corporate and agency law doc-
trines provide certainty and ensure that most, if not all, of the corporate
actors who engage in culpable and egregious behavior are held liable. Appli-
cation of CERCLA to corporate individuals, because of its strict liability
scheme, vague statutory language, and confused legislative history, creates
uncertainty; CERCLA is thus an inappropriate vehicle for the expansion of
individual liability."
Id. at 637.
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